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1. THE CONTEXTUALIZATION OF STRATEGIC MANEUVERING  
IN COMMUNICATIVE ACTIVITY TYPES 
Against the background of the standard pragma-dialectical theory, some fifteen years ago 
Van Eemeren and Houtlosser set about to extend the available analytic and evaluative 
tools by introducing the notion of ‘strategic maneuvering’ (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 
2002). Strategic maneuvering refers to the arguers’ continual efforts to reconcile in their 
argumentative moves aiming for effectiveness with being reasonable. Strategic maneu-
vering takes place in all stages of the argumentative process of resolving a difference of 
opinion on the merits. Taking account of the strategic maneuvering involved in argumen-
tative discourse means integrating rhetorical insights into the pragma-dialectical frame-
work for analysis and evaluation. In Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse, 
a monograph van Eemeren published last year, he has made clear in what ways taking 
account of the strategic maneuvering leads to deeper and more precise analyses and evalua-
tions, which can—on top of that—be accounted for more thoroughly (van Eemeren 2010). 
 Strategic maneuvering manifests itself in all argumentative moves in the choice 
that is made from the ‘topical potential’ available at a particular point in the discourse, 
the adaptation to ‘audience demand’, and the ‘presentational devices’ that are used. Be-
cause these three aspects of strategic maneuvering always manifest themselves simulta-
neously, they can only be distinguished analytically. However, in order to achieve a satis-
factory analysis, all three aspects need to be taken into account, together with their mutu-
al interaction. When strategic maneuvering is also taken into account in the evaluation of 
argumentative discourse, the evaluation concentrates in the first place on ‘derailments’ of 
strategic maneuvering in which one or more of the rules for critical discussion have been 
violated, so that a fallacy has been committed. Incorporating strategic maneuvering in the 
analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse requires in both cases taking account 
of the ‘macro’-context of the kind of communicative practice in which the discourse takes 
place. This is necessary because the contextualization of the discourse in a specific 
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‘communicative activity type’ may create certain preconditions for strategic maneuvering 
that must be considered in the analysis and the evaluation.
1
 
 Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse can only be studied in the 
context of real-life communicative activities. These communicative activities are always 
in some way connected with certain more or less institutionalized contexts, such as the 
legal context, the political context or the interpersonal context, in which they serve insti-
tutionally relevant purposes.
2
 In the various kinds of contexts, the types of communica-
tive activities pertinent to the context concerned will have become conventionalized in 
accordance with varying kinds of requirements. As a consequence, in the argumentative 
discourse taking place in such communicative activity types the possibilities for strategic 
maneuvering are to some extent determined by certain institutional preconditions. This 
means that in the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse due attention needs 
to be paid to the macro-context of the communicative activity type in which the discourse 
takes places and the institutional preconditions this activity type imposes on the strategic 
maneuvering (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2005; van Eemeren 2010: 129-162). 
2. CHARACTERIZING COMMUNICATIVE ACTIVITY  
TYPES ARGUMENTATIVELY 
Defining a communicative activity type amounts to describing, starting from the commu-
nicative domain to which the communicative activity belongs, the institutional conven-
tions of the activity type that are instrumental in realizing the ‘institutional point’ of the 
activity type through the use a particular ‘genre’ of communicative activity. In some 
strongly formalized communicative activity types the institutional conventions may be 
fully explicit constitutive or regulative rules. In less formalized communicative activity 
types the institutional conventions are largely implicit rules of some kind, informally es-
tablished practices or simply extractions of common usage.
3
 The conventionalization of 
every communicative practice that can be intersubjectively recognized as a communica-
tive activity type may be deemed dependent on the rationale of the existence of the com-
municative activity that constitutes its institutional point. 
 The institutional point of a communicative activity type reflects the institutional 
needs the communicative practice aims to satisfy. In the communicative domain to which 
the communicative activity type belongs the institutional point manifests itself in all 
speech events that are specimens of that communicative activity type. Although individu-
                                                 
1
  The concept of activity type is explained in more detail in van Eemeren (2010: 129-163). Levinson 
described an activity type as a “fuzzy category whose focal members are goal-defined, socially consti-
tuted, bounded, events with constraints on participants, setting, and so on, but above all on the kinds of 
allowable contributions” (1992: 69). 
2
  We use the term institutionalized in a very broad sense, so that it refers to any established macro-
context in which certain communicative conventions have developed. 
3
  This approach connects with “rational choice institutionalism” within New Institutionalism (March & Olsen 
1984: 734). According to Hall and Taylor, rational choice institutionalism draws our attention to “the role that 
strategic interaction between actors plays in the determination of political outcomes” (1996: 951). 
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al speech events can very well be examined for their own sake,
4
 when we examine speech 
events as argumentation theorists we generally view them as tokens, instantiations or rep-
resentations of a communicative activity type we are interested in. Our attention is then 
concentrated on a particular communicative activity type as a communicative practice 
whose conventionalization serves the institutional needs of a certain domain of communi-
cative activity through the implementation of a specific genre of communicative activity 
in actual speech events.
5
  
 Communicative activity types may very well be non-argumentative. More often 
than not, however, in communicative activity types argumentation plays a part, whether 
structurally or incidentally. A public debate, for example, is inherently argumentative, 
and a political interview is argumentative in essence. As a rule, love letters and prayers, 
for instance, are not argumentative, but even they may coincidentally be argumentative. 
This is, for example, the case when the writer of the love letter or the one who says the 
prayer tries to make things go his way by supporting the desired outcome of the speech 
event with arguments. When communicative activity types that are inherently or essen-
tially argumentative, or other communicative activity types with argumentative compo-
nents, are analyzed for their argumentative dimension, so that these communicative activ-
ity types are characterized argumentatively, it can be said that they are viewed as argu-
mentative activity types (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2005). 
 In characterizing a communicative activity type argumentatively, the pragma-
dialectical model of a critical discussion can be instrumental. Depending on the require-
ments of the institutional context concerned, in the various argumentative activity types 
that can be distinguished in argumentative reality the four stages of a critical discussion 
will be “realized” in different ways. In their empirical counterparts in the speech events 
actualizing certain argumentative activity types, the stages of a critical discussion take a 
specific shape, which differentiates the various activity types in argumentatively relevant 
ways from each other. In characterizing the activity types argumentatively it must there-
fore be determined what the distinctive features are of the way in which the four stages of 
a critical discussion manifest themselves in these activity types in their empirical coun-
terparts. This means that a characterization needs to be given of the way in which the 
confrontation stage manifests itself in the activity type prototypically in the ‘initial situa-
tion’, the way in which the opening stage manifests itself prototypically in the procedural 
and material ‘starting points’, the way in which the argumentation stage manifests itself 
prototypically in the ‘argumentative means and criticism’, and the way in which the con-
cluding stage manifests itself prototypically in the kind of outcome of the activity. 
                                                 
4
  This happens, for instance, when a case study of a certain historical text is conducted, as van Eemeren 
and Houtlosser (1999, 2000) did with the Apologia pamphlet published by William the Silent in 1580 in 
response to the Ban Edict issued by King Philip II of Spain. 
5
  As explained in van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2005), communicative activity types are not on a par with 
theoretical constructs such as the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion. While theoretical 
constructs are based on analytic considerations concerning the best way of reaching a certain (abstract) ob-
jective (such as resolving a difference of opinion on the merits), communicative activity types are empiri-
cally-based prototypes of conventionalized communicative practices. By distinguishing ideal models in 
this way between from argumentative activity types, we deviate from approaches to argumentative discourse 
types such as Walton and Krabbe’s (1995). See van Eemeren, Houtlosser, Ihnen and Lewinski (2010). 
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3. EXTRINSIC CONSTRAINTS ON STRATEGIC MANEUVERING  
IN POLITICAL DELIBERATION 
In this paper we would like to concentrate on some problems involved in analyzing and 
evaluating strategic maneuvering by means of deliberation in the political domain. Alt-
hough we will only discuss strategic maneuvering in the plenary debate in the European 
Parliament, political deliberation also takes place in other communicative activity types, 
such as—to mention just a few examples examined by our research group in Amster-
dam—the so-called general debate in Dutch Parliament, political interviews, and the 
‘lawmaking debate’ and Prime Minister’s Question time (PMQ) in British Parliament.6 
The general institutional point all these communicative activity types have in common on 
an abstract level is preserving democracy by deliberation. These communicative activity 
types differ, however, in their specific institutional aims and conventions. In the case of 
the general debate in Dutch Parliament, for instance, the specific institutional aim is to 
confront the government with the views of the elected representatives of the Dutch people 
on their policy plans and their financial backing. The institutional conventions of the gen-
eral debate and its format are laid down in parliamentary procedure supplemented by es-
tablished parliamentary tradition. 
 Each in their own way, the deliberative communicative activity types in the po-
litical domain we are concentrating on involve a discussion of political issues in front of 
an audience consisting of people who may be actively engaged in the discussion or not. 
As a rule, the format of the discussion is established in such a way that it imposes certain 
extrinsic constraints on the strategic maneuvering – extrinsic because they are not inher-
ent in strategic maneuvering. The format may, for instance, determine beforehand who 
decides about the speaking turns and whether there is a possibility of interruptions. It may 
even be determined that the participants may only address the chair of the meeting and that 
this chair judges the relevance of the contributions that are made. In these communicative 
activity types, in their critical exchanges, the parties always have to act in accordance with 
the explicit or implicit procedural rules of the communicative activity type concerned.  
 Among the extrinsic constraints imposed on the strategic maneuvering in the 
plenary debate in the European Parliament are not only institutionally determined regula-
tions, such as the debate format. There are also extrinsic constraints of a different kind, 
which are not inherent in the European Parliament as an institution but go nevertheless 
together with it. The most striking of these constraints is the general precondition that we 
have dubbed “the European Predicament” (van Eemeren & Garssen 2009). The term Eu-
ropean Predicament refers to the fact that at this point in time the Members of the Euro-
pean Parliament (MEPs) are not in the position to promote only the European cause, as 
they are officially expected to do, but have to make sure that they also keep in mind the 
particular interests of the country that elected them and pursue their national cause as 
well. More strongly than parliamentarians representing a certain local constituency in 
national parliaments, they are forced to support their national interests emphatically.
7
 
                                                 
6
  See Tonnard (2009), Andone (2009), Ihnen (2010), and Mohammed (2009), respectively.  
7
  As we showed earlier, in particular when agriculture or industry is at issue, MEPs who feel that their 
country will not really benefit from the legislation that is proposed (or may even suffer from it) are in-
clined to promote views or propose amendments that better combine serving the interests of the Europe-
an Union with protecting their national interests (van Eemeren & Garssen 2010). 
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Otherwise they will be severely criticized, not just by their own voters but by their home 
country in general. It is clear, for example, from the contributions made by certain MEPs 
to the plenary debate in European Parliament about the growing of tobacco that they are 
fully aware of their unofficial national obligation. This is why next to ‘primary precondi-
tions’ for strategic maneuvering, which are as a rule official, usually formal, and often 
procedural, we distinguish also ‘secondary preconditions’, which are as a rule unofficial, 
usually informal, and often substantial (van Eemeren 2010: 152). 
 Next to the European Predicament, more specific preconditions can be men-
tioned that play a part in pursuing the institutional point of the activity type of plenary 
debate in the European Parliament which are secondary preconditions for the strategic 
maneuvering. Just as in other types of political deliberation, the political goals that are 
pursued by the participants in the debate are a secondary precondition for the strategic 
maneuvering. Because the plenary debate is conducted between MEPs belonging to dif-
ferent Political Groups, this precondition constitutes a factor pertinent to the analysis. 
Another secondary precondition stems from the typical place the European Parliament 
occupies in the institutional organization of the European Union (EU). The European 
Parliament has in particular close ties with two other institutional bodies, the Council of 
the EU, consisting of government ministers from all member states, and the European 
Commission, the politically independent institution upholding the interests of the EU as a 
whole.
8
 In accordance with the so-called co-decision procedure, the European Parliament 
decides together with the European Council on legislation and policies initiated and pro-
posed by the European Commission. The plenary debate can be attended both by mem-
bers of the Commission and by members of the Council. A normal procedure for MEPs 
is, for instance, to ask questions in writing questions to European Commissioners. Often 
these questions are about new regulations or policies proposed by the Commission. Such 
a written question can give occasion to a debate that is attended by the Commissioner 
responsible for the regulation at hand. Characteristically, the debate then opens with the 
‘author’ of the question reading it out to the Parliament. Next, the commissioner replies 
to the question and subsequently MEPs react. This results in a rather complex situation, 
because the MEPs are addressing several audiences at the same time. 
4. THE COMPLEXITIES OF DEALING WITH AUDIENCE DEMAND  
IN POLITICAL DELIBERATION  
Adaptation to audience demand in strategic maneuvering has to do with securing com-
munion with the people the argumentative discourse is aimed at. As has been recognized 
in the pragma-dialectical meta-theoretical principle of socialization, argumentative dis-
course is always aimed at achieving certain communicative and interactional effects on 
an audience. In order to be able to achieve these effects, the argumentative moves that are 
made must at each stage of the resolution process connect well with the audience’s frame 
of reference, so that they will be optimally acceptable. This requirement makes it neces-
sary to go into the question of who the audience consists of and which are their relevant 
views and preferences.  
                                                 
8
  There usually is a real opposition between the European Parliament and the two other European institutions. 
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 It may be the case that the arguer only wants to reach his immediate address-
ee(s), but it also happens that, additionally, he intends his argumentation to affect others 
(or his argumentation may affect others unintentionally
9
). These others can be people 
who are present when the argumentation is delivered but do not participate actively in the 
discussion, but they can, for instance, also be listeners to a radio broadcast of a speech 
delivered to another audience or television viewers watching a discussion between politi-
cians. Other examples of intended ‘third party’ audiences are the readers of a polemic 
between newspaper columnists and the scholars reading a discussion between some of 
their colleagues in a scholarly journal. In all these cases, the protagonist of a standpoint 
addresses in fact more than one antagonist. In such a ‘triadic argument’ (or even more 
complex exchange) there is, next to the ‘official’ antagonist, who is addressed directly by 
the protagonist, some third party antagonist, addressed indirectly, who also judges the ac-
ceptability of the argumentative moves that are made. In certain cases the third party antag-
onist’s verdict may even be the more important one, such as when in an election debate 
between politicians potential voters are addressed indirectly as a third party antagonist. 
 When it is clear which audience represents the antagonist the arguer considers the 
more important one to affect, we call these people the arguer’s primary audience. The per-
son or persons directly addressed by the protagonist then represent the arguer’s secondary 
audience. In an election debate conducted on television between two politicians, for in-
stance, it is clear from the outset that there is a dual audience and that the politicians con-
sider the viewers at home their primary audience. Each other they will consider only their 
secondary audience, even to the extent that they do in fact not really aim to convince each 
other of their standpoints. The argumentation they advance to each other in the debate will 
be primarily calculated to convince the viewers—or at least the largest possible part of the 
viewers susceptible to their views—and the debate with each other is made instrumental in 
achieving this purpose. However, in order not to be viewed as non-cooperative, unrespon-
sive, impolite or even rude, inadequate or incompetent by their primary audience, each par-
ty taking part in the debate must take due note of the other party’s statements, critical ques-
tions and other argumentative moves, and needs to respond to them in a satisfactory way. 
Although in this kind of political deliberation the political opponent that is addressed di-
rectly is as a rule not the primary target for convincing, the argumentative moves he makes 
need to be dealt with adequately all the same. A vital part of the strategic maneuvering go-
ing on in such political deliberation is aimed at doing exactly that. 
 As a matter of course, the audience addressed in political deliberation with a 
third party audience is hardly ever completely homogenous. In a public debate on poli-
tics, for instance, a protagonist’s official antagonists, who are in this case his secondary 
audience, have as a rule rather different political views and preferences than the protago-
nist because they represent other political parties in the debate than the protagonist. The 
primary audience consists in this case of the people attending the debate who the protag-
onist regards as his potential voters. If the primary audience is homogenous, it can be 
regarded as a “collective” antagonist (just as a homogenous group of advocates of a 
                                                 
9
  Ede and Lunsford (1984) distinguish between the ‘audience addressed’, which consists in principle of 
people who are physically present when a speech is delivered, and the ‘audience invoked’, which refers 
to the intended audience. This is not the same distinction as I make here, because people who happen to 
listen in can be present when the argumentation is delivered without being the intended audience. See 
also van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: 99). 
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standpoint can be regarded as a “collective” protagonist). Often, however, the people at-
tending or viewing a political debate will differ not only in the way they speak or dress, 
but also in ways more relevant to their appreciation of the argumentative moves that are 
made. They may, for instance, have different professional and cultural interests so that 
different kinds of issues and considerations are important to them. An audience which is 
heterogeneous with respect to the points at issue or the starting points of the argumenta-
tive exchange is called a composite audience.
10
 In analyzing and evaluating the manage-
ment of audience demand in strategic maneuvering in the communicative activity types 
of political deliberation not only the difference between primary and secondary audienc-
es, but also the composition of composite audiences needs to be taken into account. 
5. THE AUDIENCE’S FRAME OF REFERENCE AND  
THE ARGUMENTATIVE SITUATION 
In a dialectical perspective on argumentative discourse, such as the pragma-dialectical 
one, the audience is always considered to be an active and critical discussion partner of 
the protagonist, an antagonist,
11
 even if the discourse takes place in an argumentative 
activity type that is not dialogical. In the analysis of argumentative discourse taking such 
a dialectical approach involves reconstructing systematically the commitment sets that 
have developed for the protagonist and the antagonist at the point in the discourse the 
analysis focuses on. The results of the reconstruction will be different at every point in 
the discourse, so that the inherent dynamics of argumentative discourse is reflected in the 
analysis. In this respect, the pragma-dialectical approach, however different its theoretical 
orientation may be, is fully in line with Tindale’s ambition “to capture and express the 
dynamics of argumentation as a communicative process” (2004: xi).12  
 In argumentative practice, adaptation to audience demand amounts to choosing the 
argumentative moves that are made in such a way that there is the broadest possible zone of 
agreement between the relevant views and preferences of the arguer and the audience. This 
means that, on the one hand, the arguer adopts, as much as his strategic purposes allow him 
to do, at every point in the discussion the frame of reference that, going by its avowed 
commitments, the audience may be expected to have. It means that, on the other hand, the 
arguer tries to convey, as much as the audience’s views and preferences seem to allow him 
to do, the kind of perspective on the argumentative situation that he intends the audience to 
have. In choosing his arguments in an audience-directed way he may, for instance, consider 
that certain arguments among the arguments ready for topical selection create exactly the 
                                                 
10
  Others just speak of a heterogeneous audience (e.g. Ede & Lunsford 1984). Benoit and d’Agostine 
(1994) use the term multiple audience. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958/1969: 21) use the term 
composite audience when different groups are simultaneously addressed.  
11
  Because pragma-dialecticians are interested in how argumentative discourse is used to convince rather 
than merely persuade, they presume that the audience consists of discussants that are in principle out to 
establish in a reasonable way whether the standpoints at issue are acceptable. For the distinction be-
tween convincing and persuading, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 48-49). 
12
  Although it is often not recognized, according to Tindale, “rhetorical argumentation is dialogical. That 
is, there is a dynamic sense of dialogue alive in the context” (2004: 89). To pragma-dialecticians such a 
dialogical rhetoric makes it easier to establish connections with their own (dialogical) theoretical 
framework than would be the case if rhetoric were monological, as it often appears to be. 
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kind of perspective on the argumentative situation that suits his strategic purposes well 
while it also connects with the audience’s avowed views and preferences.13 
 Adaptation to audience demand takes place—in combination with the manage-
ment of the other aspects of strategic maneuvering—in all discussion stages argumenta-
tive discourse has to go through. It may manifest itself in the confrontation stage, for ex-
ample, in keeping the difference of opinion at issue non-mixed to avoid creating contra-
dictions between the positions of the parties that are hard to solve. Perelman and Ol-
brechts-Tyteca (1969) have pointed out that one way of avoiding unsolvable contradic-
tions is to communicate a disagreement regarding values as a difference of opinion over 
facts, because the latter is generally easier to deal with. In the opening stage, adaptation 
to audience demand may, for instance, consist in giving presence only to starting points 
that the audience has no problems with and putting the difference of opinion in a perspec-
tive that is favorable to its resolution. Adaptation to audience demand in the argumenta-
tion stage may involve choosing only those arguments that agree with the interest sphere 
of the audience. In the concluding stage, finally, it may consist in portraying the result of 
the discussion in such a way that exasperating the audience by rubbing in consequences 
that are not to their liking is avoided. 
 Taking account of the frame of reference of the audience means that the views 
and preferences of the audience need to be identified which may be considered to belong 
to their starting point. In this endeavor a distinction can be made between ‘descriptive’ 
commitments, which relate to what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) call ‘the real’ 
(and include facts, truths and presumptions), and ‘normative’ commitments relating to 
‘the preferable’ (which include values, value hierarchies and loci). The normative com-
mitments in particular may vary to some extent between different audiences and different 
members of the same audience. In adapting in their strategic maneuvering to their (prima-
ry and secondary) audience’s demand, the discussants will have to rely on their audi-
ence’s commitments. They have to rely not only on the explicit commitments expressed 
in the opening stage, which can be viewed as “concessions”, but also on the implicit “con-
textual commitments” pertaining to the argumentative situation and the commitments con-
sisting of generally accepted views and preferences which have been known since Aristotle 
as endoxa.
14
 Together these commitments define the audience’s frame of reference. 
 Next to the commitments that are part of their frame of reference as an audience 
the parties taking part in argumentative discourse have also acquired commitments by 
making the argumentative moves they have made in the discourse. These commitments 
can be externalized by identifying the (direct or indirect) speech acts the parties have per-
formed in making these moves. They can be derived from the identity and correctness 
conditions applying to these speech acts.
15
 In this way the analyst can determine the sets 
of commitments the parties have accumulated at a certain point in the discourse, which 
define the ‘dialectical situation’ at that point. Together with the ‘rhetorical situation’, 
defined by commitments to be identified with the help of contextual information and the 
                                                 
13
  For the kind of “framing” involved in this endeavor, see van Eemeren (2010: 112, 126-127). 
14
  Endoxa refers to the views generally accepted in a specific culture or subculture. Referring to Aristo-
tle’s Topics, Irwin (1988) defines endoxa as commonly held beliefs (p. 8) and “beliefs of the many or 
the wise or both” (p. 37). 
15
  For the identity and correctness conditions of speech acts, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992: 30-33). 
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institutional conventions of the communicative activity type in which the argumentative 
discourse takes part, the dialectical situation provides a full picture of the argumentative 
situation at a particular point in the discourse.
16
 In handling audience demand in their 
strategic maneuvering, the arguers have to deal both with the requirements stemming 
from the views and preference that define their audience’s frame of reference and with 
the requirements stemming from the commitment sets of the discussants that define the 
argumentative situation. 
6. ADAPTING TO AUDIENCE DEMAND IN THE  
PLENARY DEBATE IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
As an illustration of the complexities involved in strategic maneuvering in political delib-
eration, we focus in this paper on the intricacies of adapting to audience demand in the 
plenary debate in the European Parliament. Political deliberation in the argumentative 
activity type of such a debate starts, as a rule from differences of opinion about policy 
issues between MEPs or Political Groups and (members of) the European Commission. 
Usually these differences of opinion take the form of a mixed disagreement. If it concerns 
a proposal or bill introduced by the European Committee, then there may also be a mixed 
difference of opinion between certain MEPs or Political Groups. This means that there 
will in fact be several mixed disagreements about the same issue at the same time.  
 The primary audience of each MEP consists of the fellow MEPs expected to be 
open to considering accepting the standpoint defended by that MEP, because it is in the 
end the European Parliament that will decide. However, the member of the European 
Commission member who made the proposal and the other MEPs or Political Groups 
represented in the European Parliament will also be addressed by the MEP. As long as 
the MEP has the intention to convince them, the Commission member and the MEPs who 
are not expected to be open to considering accepting the standpoint are not just a second-
ary audience but part of the primary audience. Because the sessions of the European Par-
liament are only scarcely watched or reported to the voters, the electorate hardly counts 
as an audience, not even as an inactive one, and is in practice virtually never the primary 
audience. A complication connected with the primary audience consisting of fellow MEPs 
who may be inclined to respond positively is this audience is often heterogeneous, if only 
because the European Predicament applies and there are even within Political Groups al-
most always certain political differences. If such differences regarding the issues or the 
starting points of the discussion exist, the primary audience is also a composite audience.
17
 
 The following plenary debate on freedom of information, held in the European 
Parliament on October 8, 2009, provides an example of a difference of opinion between 
an MEP and the European Commission which involves, since the European Parliament 
                                                 
16
  Tindale considers ‘the rhetorical audience’ to be a “complex and fluid” idea, because “audiences 
change, even in the course of argumentation” (2004: 21). Granting that during the exchange an audience 
my subtly change in a psychological sense, we only speak of a change of audience if some or all active 
members of the audience are no longer committed to the same definition of the difference of opinion or 
to the starting points previously agreed upon. 
17
  If the members of an audience have different positions in the difference of opinion, the composite audi-
ence is called a multiple audience and if they have different starting point it is called a mixed audience 
(van Eemeren 2010: 110). In a great many cases a composite audience will be both multiple and mixed. 
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still has to be convinced, at the same time a difference of opinion between the MEP and 
the parliament as a whole. In other words: there are here two primary audiences or a pri-
mary audience that consists of two different parts. European Commissioner Viviane Red-
ing started the debate by stating that the EU institutions should not be used to solve prob-
lems which under the existing Treaties are to be solved at a national level. The MEP So-
phia in’t Veld shows herself to be a true European Parliamentarian by reacting as follows 
against this standpoint: 
I have to confess I was rather shocked by the statement of Commissioner Reding because, in-
deed, the Member States are primarily responsible for ensuring respect for democracy and 
fundamental rights. But you are wrong if you say that the EU has no role to play here. First of 
all, there is Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, which reads: ‘The Union is founded 
on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.’ And to prove that 
that was not just a hollow statement, the European Union furnished itself with Article 7 – the 
legal instrument to enforce Article 6. Secondly, Mrs Reding, when we are negotiating with 
candidate states, we insist that they apply the highest standards of press freedom, otherwise 
they cannot join the European Union.  
The MEPs constituting the primary audience in plenary debates in the European Parlia-
ment are the ones who need to be convinced of the acceptability of new legalization or 
policy proposals. When a European Commisioner is as a ‘third’ party present at the de-
bate, MEPs frequently seize the occasion to make it seem as if there is a conflict of opin-
ion between the European Parliament as a whole and the European Commission. The 
strategic advantage of this to the debater is that it may look as if his standpoint has al-
ready been accepted by the Parliament. An example of this occurred in a debate that took 
place on May 5, 2009, when European Commissioner Mariann Fisher Boel had to react to 
a series of questions from MEPs about the Commission’s proposal to allow labeling 
wines composed of a mixture of white and red wine as rosé wine. This would give the 
European wine growers a better position on the world market since in the USA and in 
other parts of the world these kind of mixtures are already sold as rosé wine. The Italian 
MEP Elisabetta Gardini reacted as follows: 
Not long ago, very recently, in my region – I am from the Veneto – an event was held known 
as Vinitaly, which is one of the most important events in the world of wine and a hugely suc-
cessful petition was drawn up there in defence of rosé wines. It was signed by great Italian 
wineries, great wine producers, but signatures also came from other parts of Europe – signa-
tures came from the public in Holland, France, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Po-
land, Lithuania and Ukraine. Passion for rosé wine, as you can see, is authentic and knows no 
borders except, so it seems, within the European Commission, even though we may talk 
about culture, local values and tradition. 
By stating that the passion for real rosé wine is internationally recognized and that the 
European Commission is the only real opponent to the proposal to protect rosé wine, Ms. 
Gardini gives the impression that there is a mixed debate between the European Parlia-
ment and the European Commission, thus making it look as if the Parliament has already 
agreed about this issue. This, however, is not the case. There is in fact a mixed disagree-
ment between Gardini and the Commissioner, and the other MEPs may not be in agree-
ment with Gardini at all. 
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 Françoise Grossetête, one of the MEPs who had asked the questions uses the 
same kind of tactic. She uses the personal pronoun ‘we’, as if she can refer to the whole 
parliament, and talks about ‘our’ wine growers, thus indicating that this is not just her 
own opinion or that of her Political Group. On top of that, she stresses by the harsh tone 
of her concluding remarks the opposition between the European Parliament and the Eu-
ropean Commission: 
Commissioner, earlier you said that you had not received any suggestions and that you were 
waiting for proposals, and so on. On the contrary, suggestions have been put to you. You met 
our wine growers. They told you that they did not want this. They told you that they person-
ally did not want to be forced to specify the designation ‘traditional rosé wine’ in order to 
distinguish it from the rosé wine which naturally will not state ‘blended’. Therefore you can-
not say that no one has suggested anything to you. Above all, with regard to rosé Cham-
pagne, we are well aware that it is an oenological product which has nothing to do with the 
blending as proposed here: white wine and red wine. We are asking you to find the courage, 
Mrs Fischer Boel, not to call blended white and red wine ‘rosé wine’. This is what we are 
asking you. This is our suggestion to you. Do not penalize real wine growers. How do you 
expect our fellow citizens to understand such a stance on the part of the European Commis-
sion? You turn a deaf ear to all our arguments: this is absolutely incomprehensible.  
7. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to illustrate that the room for strategic maneuvering in po-
litical deliberation in the plenary debate in the European Parliament is neither exclusively 
determined by the topical potential of reasonable, i.e. analytically relevant, argumentative 
moves that can, according to the pertinent dialectical profile, in principle be made by the 
arguer, nor by the verbal repertoire of presentational options that are in principle availa-
ble to the arguer for carrying out these argumentative moves. We have shown that the 
room for strategic maneuvering available to the arguer is also determined by the demands 
of the audience he intends to address. It depends on the choices he is willing to make in 
adapting to their frame of reference at the point the strategic maneuvering takes place and 
on the perspective on the argumentative situation he induces the audience to adopt. If in 
strategic maneuvering a primary and a secondary audience need to be addressed at the 
same time and the primary audience and the secondary audience are on top of that not 
homogeneous, then the audience the arguer intends to address is complex in several re-
spects. Due to the primary and secondary institutional preconditions of this communica-
tive activity type, in the strategic maneuvering that takes place in the plenary debate in 
the European Parliament this is usually the case. When engaging in this communicative 
activity type, MEPs need to meet audience demand by making both the adaptations that 
are required because of the views and preferences that determine in a particular case the 
frame of reference of (the relevant part of) each audience and the adaptations that are 
required because of the commitment sets defining in a particular case the argumentative 
situation for (the relevant part of) each audience. 
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Van Eemeren and Garssen extend the pragma-dialectical theory of strategic maneuvering 
to account for complex forms of audience demand in particular institutional contexts. 
They illustrate some of their theoretical points with examples taken from a debate in the 
European Parliament. The analysis reveals an interesting argumentative move specific to 
this communicative situation, a tactic that exploits certain institutional tensions within a 
complex, heterogeneous audience to create a misleading impression that the primary au-
dience as a whole already agrees with the protagonist.    
 As illustrated by this analysis, the concept of strategic maneuvering has been a 
very useful addition to the analytical apparatus of pragma-dialectics. Strategic maneuvering 
refers to the use of rhetorical strategies by arguers who attempt to maximize their practical 
success without violating the norm of reasonableness articulated through an ideal model of 
critical discussion. Whereas critical discussion is a normative concept, strategic maneuver-
ing is a descriptive concept intended to facilitate more precise analysis and evaluation of 
argumentation by taking account of pragmatic elements of the specific institutional setting 
and communicative activity type in which the argumentation occurs. The analysis allows 
finer lines to be drawn between argumentative moves that are communicatively strategic 
but not unreasonable versus moves that actually violate the pragma-dialectical rules of crit-
ical discussion, thus committing pragma-dialectical fallacies through what are called “de-
railments” of strategic maneuvering. Although the argumentative tactic illustrated in this 
paper is described as having created a false impression in the cases examined, the authors 
do not explicitly argue that the tactic was fallacious or not in those instances.  
 While more attention to that issue would have been helpful, the gains in empiri-
cal sensitivity and analytical insight afforded by this extension of the theory of strategic 
maneuvering are nevertheless apparent in this paper and prompt me to reflect on further 
ways in which the theory could be extended. The remainder of this commentary discusses 
three aspects of strategic maneuvering not mentioned by van Eemeren and Garssen, all of 
which I argue are conceptually implied by the ideal model of critical discussion and sug-
gest promising directions for pragma-dialectical research. While the first two of these 
extensions seem quite straightforward, the third poses an interesting problem for the nor-
mative evaluation of strategic maneuvering. Specifically, it implies that in some cases the 
pragma-dialectical analysis and evaluation of strategic maneuvering must step outside of 
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its own normative framework to assess the appropriateness of subordinating of pragma-
dialectical norms of critical discussion to the competing norms of particular institutions 
or communicative activity types. 
2. STRATEGIC MANEUVERING IN RETRACTING A STANDPOINT 
To date, the analysis of strategic maneuvering has focused primarily on discursive strate-
gies that are used in advancing and defending standpoints, but the ideal model of critical 
discussion implies that equal attention should be given to the strategic maneuvering that 
may be involved in accepting the arguments of opponents and retracting standpoints. The 
reasonable resolution of a difference of opinion can only occur if all parties are willing to 
yield to the better arguments of others. This requirement is codified in the Closure rule of 
critical discussion, which states: 
A failed defense of a standpoint must result in the protagonist retracting the standpoint, and a 
successful defense of a standpoint must result in the antagonist retracting his or her doubts. 
(van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans 2002: 183) 
The discursive process of retracting standpoints and accepting the arguments of opponents is 
particularly interesting, not only because of its important role in the ideal model but also be-
cause of the distinct pragmatic concerns that seem likely to influence the strategic maneuver-
ing of arguers in this position. Those concerns may include at least the following: 
 A dialectical concern to give up neither more nor less of one’s standpoint than is 
warranted by the current state of the argumentation, which in many cases may be 
rather uncertain. 
 A personal concern to minimize the immediate loss of face or the longer term 
damage to one’s reputation that may result from “losing” an important argument.  
 A social concern to minimize the extent to which the retraction of a standpoint 
may be seen as violating the arguer’s commitments to others, for example if the 
arguer has been speaking on behalf of a group.  
Concerns such as these seem likely to produce distinct forms of strategic maneuvering 
that require empirical investigation. The arguer may retract certain parts or interpretations 
of her standpoint while attempting to maintain others, or may only admit that she is “pos-
sibly” wrong. She may attempt to give the impression that her standpoint has not 
changed, even while retracting it implicitly in whole or in part (Craig and Sanusi 2000).  
 Much of this strategic maneuvering seems oriented to minimizing concessions 
and retaining as much as possible of the arguer’s position, but one can imagine situations 
in which an arguer would choose instead to maximize or even exaggerate her conversion 
to an opponent’s view. This could be done to curry favour with a powerful superior or to 
display (for example to members of a group on behalf of which the arguer is committed 
to speak) that the arguer has given up her standpoint, not out of weakness or disloyalty 




3. STRATEGIC MANEUVERING TO INFLUENCE HIGHER-ORDER CONDITIONS 
A second aspect of strategic maneuvering that has not received much attention by prag-
ma-dialectical scholars involves maneuvering around the higher-order conditions of criti-
cal discussion. As explained by van Eemeren et al. (1993: 31-34) the ideal model of criti-
cal discussion constitutes “a set of ‘first-order’ conditions for the rational resolution of 
disagreements” (p. 31), but the possibility for these first-order conditions to obtain de-
pends on at least two levels of higher-order conditions. Second-order conditions involve 
psychological states of the arguers that make them more or less able or willing to follow 
the first-order rules of critical discussion. Extreme anger or dogmatism, for example, 
could cause a failure of second-order conditions. Third-order conditions refer to the social 
situation in which argumentation occurs, which may facilitate or inhibit arguers from 
following the rules of critical discussion. Extreme inequalities of power or institutional 
norms that limit freedom of speech or discourage questioning certain assumptions, for 
example, could cause a failure of third-order conditions, making critical discussion im-
possible. Beyond these levels there are fourth-order conditions that affect not only critical 
discussion but the possibility of communication in general, such as the ability to speak or 
a physical setting in which the transmission and reception of messages can occur (van 
Eemeren et al. 1993: 35-36n). 
 What is particularly interesting for a theory of strategic maneuvering are the ways 
that arguers may attempt to influence these higher-order conditions in order to make critical 
discussion more or less possible in a given situation, as well as ways in which arguers may 
attempt to influence the impressions that audiences have about these higher-order condi-
tions without influencing the conditions directly.  Of great normative importance from a 
pragma-dialectical standpoint are strategic ways that arguers may attempt to influence a 
situation in order to enhance the conditions for rational deliberation (Jacobs 2000). Beyond 
such benign strategies lies a largely unexplored field of strategic maneuvering around high-
er-order conditions through which arguers may attempt to maximize their success while 
either staying within the bounds of reasonableness or failing to do so, which constitutes a 
derailment of higher-order strategic maneuvering. For example, an arguer might try to cre-
ate the impression that an opponent is being unreasonable due to anger or dogmatism, or 
might subtly suggest that the expression of a certain view is inappropriate or might have 
negative consequences. Normative assessment of such discursive moves presumably de-
pends on the critic’s assessment of the actual state of the higher-order conditions for critical 
discussion in a given situation. If critical discussion is actually impossible, an arguer can 
hardly be blamed for pointing to that reality as a reason not to engage.  An arguer who stra-
tegically maneuvers to enhance the higher-order conditions for critical discussion may be a 
kind of pragma-dialectical hero, while an arguer who maneuvers to destroy or minimize 
those higher-order conditions in order to gain strategic advantage  (for example, by intimi-
dating an opponent) may be judged harshly. There is, however, another more complicated 
kind of case that is discussed in the following section.  
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4. STRATEGIC MANEUVERING TO INFLUENCE THIRD-ORDER CONDITIONS: 
THE PROBLEM OF NORMATIVE EVALUATION 
Is critical discussion always the most reasonable communicative ideal to pursue when a 
difference of opinion arises? Yes, presumably, under ideal conditions, but perhaps not 
when the necessary higher-order conditions are insufficiently present. When higher-order 
conditions fail, we might say that critical discussion should not be pursued only because 
it is impossible under the circumstances, even though it is normatively the best way of 
dealing with a difference of opinion—that is, by attempting to achieve a reasonable reso-
lution of the difference. Whether higher-order conditions are satisfied, hence whether 
critical discussion is possible, is essentially an empirical question answerable by a de-
scriptive analysis. But would we—or, more to the point, a pragma-dialectical critic—ever 
judge that critical discussion is a normatively inappropriate way to proceed when faced 
with a difference of opinion? This judgment, I argue, not only depends on the existence 
of a contrary norm associated with a particular institution or communicative activity type, 
but also depends on a critical judgment that the contrary norm is rationally warranted and 
rightly subordinates the pragma-dialectical norm in that context. 
  To use what is probably a familiar example to most readers of this commentary, 
consider a teacher who encounters a difference of opinion with a student. Should the 
teacher engage the student in a critical discussion to resolve the difference of opinion? 
Maybe, or maybe not. Let us stipulate that the power difference between teacher and stu-
dent does not pose a higher-order barrier to critical discussion in this case. The teacher, 
we assume, is an eminently reasonable person who would gladly be proven wrong by the 
better argument. No, the problem may be that the teacher feels that engaging the student 
on this particular difference of opinion would be pedagogically inappropriate. Good ped-
agogy dictates that the teacher should strategically steer the discussion away from that 
particular disagreement in order to pursue a line of discussion more productive for the 
student’s learning. Has the teacher committed a higher-order pragma-dialectical fallacy 
by strategically avoiding a critical discussion? Should pedagogical norms subordinate 
pragma-dialectical norms in this context? This question cannot be answered without de-
fending a normative judgment about the teacher’s pedagogy.   
 The point generalizes to any communicative context in which legitimate reasons 
for avoiding critical discussion may exist. In such cases the question of higher-order con-
ditions does not refer to the possibility of critical discussion but rather to the normative 
appropriateness of critical discussion in that context. And this question cannot be an-
swered without stepping outside of the pragma-dialectical model to assess the relative 
importance of pragma-dialectical norms versus the possibly competing norms of a partic-
ular institution or communicative activity type.  
 This argument has several implications for pragma-dialectics as a field of study. 
First, it is quite likely that pragma-dialectical norms should be subordinated to other 
communicative norms in some situations. Second, in order to evaluate the higher-order 
strategic maneuvering of arguers in those situations, it is necessary to step outside of the 
ideal model of critical discussion to assess the relative importance of the competing 
norms in the particular situation. Third, a further implication is that the pragma-
dialectical approach can be usefully informed by a broader inquiry into the normative 
structure of various communicative activity types that can inform critical judgments of 
the relative importance of competing norms in particular circumstances. This line of ar-
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gument suggests a convergence of interest between the pragma-dialectical approach to 
argumentation and a more broadly communication-theoretic, empirically grounded nor-
mative approach such as grounded practical theory (Craig and Tracy 1995). By explain-
ing the contextual validity of situated norms such as reasonable hostility (Tracy, this vol-
ume), grounded practical theory has the potential to inform judgments about the relative 
importance of different communicative norms in particular situations.   
5. CONCLUSION  
Van Eemeren and Garssen have demonstrated the usefulness of extending the analysis of 
strategic maneuvering to include complex considerations involving heterogeneous audi-
ences in particular institutional contexts and communicative activity types. I hope to have 
shown that three further extensions of the analysis of strategic maneuvering also hold 
promise for enriching the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation. These include 
the analysis of strategic maneuvering in retracting standpoints, influencing higher-order 
conditions for critical discussion, and subordinating the norms of critical discussion to 
competing norms of particular institutions and communicative activity types.  
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